AI Security & Governance
Zero-trust architecture, permissions, approval flows and audit logging, designed before anything is built. The half of AI security that happens on the whiteboard rather than after an incident.
Two different questions
These are separate jobs and we keep them on separate pages, because buying the wrong one is a common and expensive mistake.
Audits, penetration testing, compliance readiness and incident response. The question is where are we exposed right now, and the answer arrives as a report with evidence. That lives on Cybersecurity.
Zero-trust AI design, permissions, approval workflows, audit logging and responsible AI policy. The question is how do we make this safe by design, before there is anything to find.
Capability
Six areas. Scope is agreed with you before anything starts.
Nothing is trusted because of where it sits. Every call is authenticated, every data path is deliberate, and a compromised component reaches as little as possible. Designed at the start, because retrofitting trust boundaries means rebuilding.
Which people and which systems may invoke which capability, on whose data. Most AI incidents are not clever attacks: they are somebody reaching something they were never meant to, through a path nobody mapped.
Which actions proceed and which stop for a person, decided explicitly and recorded. The point is that the boundary is a documented decision rather than whatever the implementation happened to do.
What was asked, what was retrieved, what was returned and who saw it - kept so an incident can be reconstructed months later. An AI system you cannot reconstruct is one you cannot defend.
Written rules on acceptable use, disclosure, human oversight and escalation, in language the people bound by them can follow. A policy nobody reads is a document, not a control.
Work shaped by ISO 27001, GDPR and SOC 2 from the first design session rather than assembled for an audit. We help you meet these frameworks; we do not certify anyone against them.
How we work
Every system, dataset and action the AI touches, and everything adjacent that it should not. Almost every real finding starts as a path nobody had drawn.
Identity, permissions, trust zones and the approval points, settled on the whiteboard while changing them is still free.
Enforcement and logging as part of the system rather than around it. Controls bolted on afterwards are the ones that get switched off under deadline.
Three stages in, the system is sound. The last two are what let your team defend it without us.
Acceptable use, oversight, disclosure and escalation, in plain language and short enough to be read. A control nobody understands is not a control.
Your team can answer what the system did and why, months later, in front of someone who is not friendly. That is the test this work is actually for.
Straight answer
Certification against ISO 27001 or SOC 2 is issued by an accredited auditor who has to be independent of the people who did the engineering. Any supplier offering you both should give you pause. What we can do is make sure the design, the controls and the evidence are in place well before that auditor arrives, so the conversation is a review rather than a rescue.
Before you ask
That one is adversarial: audits, penetration testing, compliance readiness and incident response, answering where you are exposed right now with evidence. This one is architectural, answering how to make a system safe by design before there is anything to find. Buying the wrong one is a common and expensive mistake, so we keep them on separate pages. If you want someone to go looking for holes, start there: Cybersecurity.
No, and nobody doing the engineering should. Certification is issued by an accredited auditor who must be independent of the people who built the thing. What we do is shape the design and the evidence so that the audit is a review rather than a rescue.
Because the failure modes differ. An AI system acts on instructions that arrive as data, which is a category your existing controls were not designed for, and it often holds broader read access than any single user. The controls are familiar - identity, least privilege, logging - but where they have to sit is not.
At the start, a little. It is much cheaper than the alternative: trust boundaries are close to impossible to retrofit, and the usual version of this conversation happens during an audit or after an incident, when the options are worse and the timetable is not yours.
The architecture and its reasoning, the permission model, the logging design, the policy documents and the runbooks - in your repositories, written for your engineers. The measure is whether they can defend the system without us in the room.
Next
Send us what you are planning to build, or what you have just built and have not shipped. We will tell you where the trust boundaries should be while moving them is still cheap.
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